Many analysts focus on one or more pet variables at the expense of a more systematic and comprehensive study of the relation between peacemaking and peacebuilding. Finally, most of the research is still conceived from the perspective of strong and rich countries and has not been reviewed by colleagues from weak and poor states.

Later it became an essential component of conflict prevention and of peacebuilding. Since then, the number of peacekeepers and keeping operations has increased, especially since the end of the Cold War. The new interventionism was characterized by the number and changing nature of peace operations. Analysts distinguish two or more types or generations of peace operations. Ramsbotham et al. Some authors, confusingly, include in this last type of peace operations a variety of different kinds of mechanisms, such as second- and third-generation peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, complex peace operations, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace support operations, peace maintenance, etc.

This is not primarily the result of intellectual laziness on the part of researchers or practitioners. Virtually any one has a personal sense of what peace operations are, but they are usually perceived as activities with extremely flexible boundaries MacQueen The research of peace operations focuses on several dimensions: 1 the peacekeeping and support tasks, 2 the difficult strategic environment, 3 contributors and motivations, 4 factors influencing success or failure, and 5 interconnections with the other activities of the peacebuilding process.

Researchers such as Chopra , Berdal and Economides , and MacQueen have analyzed the experiences and lessons learned, which led to the development of new types of peace operations and efforts to improve the international and regional organization. Most of the findings are based on thorough analysis of successful and less successful case studies, such as Cambodia, the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, East Timor, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone.

Jeong offers an overview of confidence and security-building measures that are needed to create an environment conducive to good governance and development: 1 confidence building by means of effective international verification measures, 2 demobilization, disarmament and reintegration DDR , 3 building local capacity to enforce peace, 4 building a local police force to bring their law enforcement up to international standards, and 5 demilitarization of the internal security system.

Analysts also identified the characteristics of the war zones which complicate the peace operations seriously. Stedman observes that peacekeepers can fall prey to spoiler leaders or parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.

Others focused on warlords, militias, paramilititary, and armies seeking control of resources through plundering, terror, and force. Duffield identified war-zone economies where civilians are a resource base to be corralled, plundered, and killed. Planners are faced with considerable difficulties finding appropriate military personnel to man and sustain missions Daniel a.

Daniel b —9 lists possible national motivations for contributing to peace operations: a sense of international obligation, regional ethos, prestige, repayment of a favor from a major power, outlet for surplus military capacity, remunerations, the desire for training and equipment, burden sharing, and better control of their own destiny.

She compares the motives for colonialism a century ago with the motives for complex peace operations, and concludes that, despite their differences, both were pursued for a combination of national interest and humanitarianism.

Politically, the responsibility to protect is not widely accepted in developing countries. Reports inside and outside the UN have identified f actors which contributed to failed peace operations, as in Somalia —5 and Rwanda —4. The Brahimi Report of put forward a wide-ranging set of recommendations. In , the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change identified a series of weaknesses and offered recommendations, such as the five criteria of legitimacy that the Security Council and anyone else involved in these decisions should always address in considering whether to authorize or apply military force seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means, and balance of consequences , and in the creation of a peacebuilding commission.

The main task of the latter is to draft long-term strategies and to facilitate the coordination of conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping, and all the other efforts needed for peacebuilding. All the peace operations have been evaluated. In the discourse on the causes of success and failure, attention has also been focused on the integration of long-term security concerns from the start Jeong , the effects of body bags and CNN coverage, the four pathologies of peace operations Farrell , the negative impact of HIV Elbe , the preoccupation with exit strategies and fear of operation creep, the dilemma of selectivity, the violence of nonintervention Chopra , and civil—military cooperation CIMIC.

Peacebuilding is about complex change; it involves concurrent activities by many people in different sectors, at several levels, in different time-scapes, and in different layers. Depending on the conflict, peacebuilding deals with actors at the local, middle, top, and international levels; it looks for synergies between the multiple transformations in diplomatic, political, economic, security, social, psychological, legal, educational, and many other sectors; it involves short-, medium-, and long-term activities, and impacts on institutional, behavioral, perceptual, and emotional layers.

A tremendous amount of research has been produced in different disciplines international relations, political sciences, strategy and security, economics, law, anthropology, psychology, humanitarian assistance studies, ecology, etc.

The work has been carried out under a great variety of headings, such as peacebuilding, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and transformation, security building, and nation building Dobbins et al. This is due to the different backgrounds of the contributors, the compartmentalization of the academic environment, and the favorable political resonance of different labels.

The research relates to six major components of the theory and praxis of peacebuilding architecture: 1 the end state, 2 the baseline, 3 the context, 4 the planning of the peacebuilding process, 5 the peacebuilding coordination, and 6 the monitoring and evaluation. The end state can be defined as the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the peace one wants to build.

Without a clear operational definition of peace, it is impossible to develop a good theory about how to achieve it. Do the researchers provide clear operational definitions of the peace they are studying?

What types of peace are distinguished? What necessary conditions for peacebuilding have they identified? How valid is their theory? The definition of peace should be clear and the theory used valid. In a great deal of research work, the end state is left vague and undefined. Sustainable peace, for example, has been framed in terms of 1 outcome characteristics, such as the absence of armed violence, the near absence of other types of violence structural, psychological and cultural , the handling of conflicts in a constructive way, and a high level of internal and external legitimacy of the achieved peace; 2 the resolution of the root causes of the conflict; and 3 the successful installation of the necessary conditions or peacebuilding blocks for sustainable peace.

Most researchers see peacebuilding as the result of transformations in multiple sectors. Chesterman studies state building as one of many other activities necessary for peacebuilding. Paris focuses on two peace-enhancing conditions: marketization and democratization.

Cousens et al. Human security implies the need for intervening in the domains of political security and governance, community security and societal stability, personal security and human rights, and, lastly, economic security.

Mason and Meernik define peace as a combination of negative peace and positive peace. The latter involves a transformation of the conflict by means of democratization efforts, the establishment of truth commissions, the establishment of security, and long-term economic and social development.

Jeong highlights four peacebuilding pillars: security and demilitarization, political transition, development, and reconciliation and social rehabilitation.

Orr distinguishes four interrelated sets of tasks to rebuild countries and win the peace: security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation. Darby and Mac Ginty pay attention to peacemaking, demobilization, disarmament and reconstruction, democratization and power sharing, refugees, and negotiating how to deal with past human rights violations.

Ryan stresses the importance of peacemaking, reconciliation, political transformation, development, and sentimental education. In his study of nation building, Dobbins et al. For these conditions to be realized, peacebuilding leadership is paramount. An urgent task for the research community is to distill from this vast, but scattered, reservoir of knowledge a valid and comprehensive theory of peacebuilding. There is more multidisciplinary than transdisciplinary research.

This could be attributed to methodological difficulties associated with studying dynamic interactions between multiple transitions, but also to reality, where peacebuilding tends to boil down to a compilation of peacebuilding measures and efforts designed and implemented by different departments or actors.

The baseline is the situation at the starting point of a peacebuilding intervention. Before planning the intervention, it is important to conduct an accurate analysis of the conflict and of the peacebuilding deficiencies and potential. The literature is flooded with all kinds of models to analyze and anticipate conflicts. These models require information about the parties involved, the issues, the positions, the alternatives to a negotiated agreement, the conflict environment, the strategic thinking of the parties, the current interaction, the legacy, and the costs and benefits.

Despite the availability of these analytic and anticipatory tools, problems continue to hamper accurate analysis.

There is a lack of accurate information about nonarmed violence and the complex dynamics of conflicts. Violence tends to be defined narrowly and information about second- and third-class victims is difficult to find.

Another problem relates to the exclusion of parties from the analysis of the conflict. Exclusion is an obstacle to a comprehensive understanding of the conflict, which should involve empathy and a recognition of the distinctive cultural understandings of the conflict and its resolution, which have to be clarified, elucidated, and enhanced through reflection and dialogue.

Lederach calls this the elicitive approach. Fourth, it is difficult to find data on the profits and profiteers of violent conflicts. Finally, peacebuilding research is still lacking in adequate conflict differentiation. A positive contribution to the analysis of the baseline has been the measurement of the difficulty of the conflict. Caplan correlates difficulty with the clarity and appeal of operational objectives.

Chesterman links clarity of purpose to success. For Doyle , hostile or incoherent factions are obstacles for peacebuilding operations. Reychler and Langer monitor seven clusters of variables to assess the degree of difficulty: the parties involved, the issues, the conflict styles, the internal opportunity structure, the legacy of the conflict, the internal readiness for peace, and the external involvement and support of the peace process.

To evaluate the relevance of peacebuilding efforts, a comparison has to be made between the situation at the start of the intervention and the necessary conditions to realize the envisaged peace. The quality of peacebuilding deficiency assessment depends on the clarity of the definition of peace, the validity of the peacebuilding theory, and the availability of reliable information.

There are checklists for assessing the quality of the peace negotiation process, the accord, and the implementation Reychler et al. The economy of peace focuses on human development, poverty, vertical and horizontal inequality, trust and economic expectation, greed and grievance Collier and Hoeffler , relative deprivation, and the politico-economic perspectives of young populations. An important contribution to assessment of horizontal inequality has been made by the research team of Stewart Horizontal inequalities are inequalities in economic, social, or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups.

In many countries, researching horizontal inequality between identity groups is considered risky and politically incorrect and is therefore not done. In security assessment, there are indicators of internal and external security, human security, demobilization, disarmament, social and military integration, modernization of the military forces, modernization and demilitarization of the police, and multilateral or cooperative security. The moral-political environment is more difficult to assess because it requires data on 1 hope-raising measures, 2 the development of a we-ness feeling and multiple loyalties, 3 dealing with the past and reconciliation, 4 trust, 5 social capital, and 6 the dismantlement of senti-mental walls.

Senti-mental walls are attitudes and feelings, perceptions and expectations, causal analyses and attributions of responsibility, strategic analyses, values, preferences, taboos, and social psychological pressures such as conformity pressure, group-think, and political correctness which stand in the way of sustainable peacebuilding.

Lindner ; deals with emotions, especially humiliation in conflict and peacebuilding. For Wallensteen , the agenda of peace is formed by trauma and hopes. For the fourth cluster of peace conditions, there are checklists assessing transitional, retributive, and restorative justice, the role of the media, peace education, and humanitarian aid. The fifth cluster of multilateral support looks at positive and negative roles enacted by external governmental and nongovernmental actors.

Remarkably, a great number of analysts focus on the domestic scene and its close neighborhood. The donor community has the propensity to overlook or underestimate the role of the global international political and economic environment, especially the impact of imbalances of institutionalized military, political, economic, and cultural power and the roles of lobbies, interest groups, diasporas, and extralegal arms, drugs, and people dealers, Falk and Mearsheimer and Walt deal with these.

Some label such research as politically incorrect, others as critical and emancipatory. In any case, conflict analysis and peacebuilding deficiency assessment would benefit from domination-free discourse and analysis. Lederach , Anderson , and others stress the importance of identifying the available and potential peacebuilding socio-economic and socio-cultural resources.

The lack of universal formulae and the complexity of conflicts requires the development of a high level of context sensitivity. It requires a deep appreciation of the impact of the context on the peacebuilding process and vice versa. Contextual judgment can be more important than knowledge of the 10 best peacebuilding practices in other situations. The contextual features are: scope, time, preservation, diversity, capability, capacity, readiness for change, and power Balogun and Hailey Scope : Does the change affect the whole country as well as all sectors and levels, or does it impact only on part of the country or a particular sector?

Does peace imply a radical transformation, a reconstruction or a realignment of the situation? Time : How much time does the peacebuilder have to build peace? Are the stakeholders expecting short-term results from the intervention?

Do they see their intervention as crisis management or as a long-term peacebuilding process? Efforts have been undertaken to integrate crisis management with peacebuilding. Preservation : To what extent is it essential to maintain continuity in certain practices or preserve specific assets?

Diversity : Is the group of actors involved in the peacebuilding process diverse or relatively homogeneous in terms of its values, norms, and attitudes? Are there many cultures or subcultures within the country? Are there conflicting and common interests? Capability : How capable or competent are the peace builders at managing the peacebuilding process?

Is there enough expertise at the policy, management, and individual levels? Ingelstam , Perrigo and Pearce , and Fitzduff have been researching the qualifications expected and required of those involved in peacebuilding activities.

Related to the search for qualities is the study of successful mediators and of peacebuilding leadership Reychler and Stellamans Capacity : What peacebuilding tools are available? What financial and human resources are available for peacebuilding? Lund and Mehler have mapped measures and tools to remedy peacebuilding deficiencies. Readiness : Are the external actors willing and motivated for peacebuilding? How much support domestic and international is there for change? Are the internal actors ready for change?

Power : Who are the major stakeholders? How much power do they have? Who are the stakeholders whose support must be canvassed? Sustainable peacebuilding requires not only hard, soft, and smart power, but above all integrative power. Integrative power is the power that binds humans together. Though it is seldom studied or discussed, Boulding argues that it is the strongest form of power, especially because exchange and coercive power cannot operate without integrative power.

The fourth component is the planning of the peacebuilding process. This is one of the most fascinating and complex areas of study, with a long way to go in terms of further research.

In this component of the architecture of peacebuilding, several choices need to be made about how to build peace. This relates to the framing of time, entry and exit, priority setting, pacing the process, creating synergies, and anticipating and reducing negative side effects. This involves choices about differentiating phases in the process, and the framing of the building process as a linear, circular, or procedural activity Murnighan and Mowen All the authors perceive peacebuilding to be a multiphased process, each phase characterized by its own priorities.

The peacebuilding strategy of the US Department of State uses the same peacebuilding phases. Lederach uses a four-phased approach: the crisis and issues stage 2—6 months ; the people and relationships stage 1—2 years ; the institutions or subsystem phase 5—10 years ; and finally the phase that needs work for generations — the vision of peace and the desired future that all hope for and move towards.

Lederach opts for a nonlinear, procedural perspective; NEPAD uses a more linear perspective with clearly defined timetables. The entry—exit decision has facets, such as when to intervene, the expected exit, when and how to exit instant vs phased withdrawal , assessing the impacts of withdrawal, and the choice of follow-up arrangements. An exit strategy cannot compensate, easily or at all, for major deficiencies in the design or implementation of a territorial administration, but by the same token, a poorly conceived exit strategy can jeopardize the achievements of the international administration and imperil the viability of the new state or territory.

Changes can be implemented, either in an all-at-once, big bang fashion, or in a more incremental, step-by-step, stage-by-stage fashion. In the different phases of the conflict transformation, which tasks get priority or are allocated more resources and time than others? Although there is a general consensus on the need for complementarity, several authors tend to prioritize one or more areas of intervention Llamazares Security is considered the key to successful postwar peacebuilding and is vital for the freedom of movement, for the absence of personal or group threats, and for safe access to resources in the postwar setting.

A second group sees economic development as the path to success and claims that the economic vulnerability should be tackled from the beginning. For a third group, social welfare and civil society is of vital importance for the regeneration of societies and peacebuilding.

Pugh points to imbalance between short-term, hard, visible reconstruction measures and soft, long-term social-civil programs. A fourth group stresses the economic agendas of war as a key source of conflict. Collier and Sambanis recommend that good peacebuilding must include disincentives for those benefiting from war in order to reduce their influence over the process. A fifth group claims that priority should be given to the remediation of the political and institutional deficits.

A sixth group highlights the importance of justice and reconciliation. Lambourne b argues that both justice and reconciliation are fundamentally significant goals that need to be addressed in the design of successful postconflict peacebuilding processes and mechanisms, especially in the aftermath of genocide.

Finally, there is the social-psychological approach. Rothstein points out the value of psychological and emotional components in the resolution of protracted conflicts. Are all the tasks implemented synchronically or is there a clear sequencing of the efforts? This is one of the least systematically researched aspects of the peacebuilding process. Several approaches can be distinguished: 1 the free-for-all approach: the underlying assumption is that more peacebuilding interventions will add up to more peace; 2 the ideology-driven approach, based on a belief in the primacy of security, development, democracy, or other types of interventions in peacebuilding; 3 the power-driven approach which claims that power makes or breaks peace; 4 the theory-driven approach, based on the research of successful and unsuccessful sequencing of different activities within and between different sectors; 5 the reconciliation-driven approach based on the belief that competing views and values need to be reconciled.

Paris claims that pushing war-shattered states into stable market democracies too quickly can have damaging and destabilizing effects. A sensible approach would be to establish a system of domestic institutions capable of managing the disruptive effects of democratization and marketization in a first phase, and only then to phase in political and economic reforms as conditions warrant.

Furthermore, economic gains in the medium and long term can be created if in the short-term macro-economic policies are socially sensitive Collier et al.

How much attention is paid to the positive and negative cross-impacts of efforts in different sectors and at different levels? Have the impacts been assessed proactively? The assessment of peace and conflict impacts is not new. In December , J. Keynes argued that the terms of the Versailles Treaty would be disastrous for both Germany and its allies. At the end of the book he presented an alternative policy — something like a Marshall Plan — providing Germany with resources that would enable it to pay a reasonable amount of restitution, but also to recover economically and socially.

All peacebuilders are interdependent in that they cannot achieve peace by themselves Lederach Despite growing demands for working with an integrated framework and coordinating peace efforts, there is still a coherence deficit. The Upstein study of peacebuilding, which analyzed peacebuilding projects in Germany, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Norway in the s, showed a lack of coherence at the national strategic level Smith Similar findings were identified at the international level and in fragile states United Nations ; Patrick and Brown Jones distinguishes three types of coordination problems in deadly conflicts: divergent and diffuse efforts in Bosnia, conflicting strategies in Rwanda, and a fragmented international presence in Burundi.

Inadequate coordination increases the risks of duplication, inefficient spending, a lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting the goals, and a reduced capacity for delivery de Coning On the other hand, greater coordination and coherence does not automatically mean better peacebuilding operations. Part of the research tries to identify the obstacles to fruitful coordination. An assessment of cooperation and coordination in peacebuilding implies an analysis of the 1 spaces of coordination, 2 the participation, 3 the elements of coordination, 4 the degree of coordination, and 5 strategy formation.

Spaces of coordination : Most analysts distinguish four coordination spaces: a agency coordination or consistency between the politics and actions of an individual agency, b whole-government coordination or consistency among the policies of different agencies in a country, c external-donor coherence or consistency between the policies pursued by external actors in a country, and d internal—external coordination, or consistency between the policies of internal and external actors in a conflict zone Picciotto ; Owen and Travers ; de Coning Caplan emphasizes that coordination is needed at different levels: the strategic level, the tactical level, and the field level.

Participation : Who is involved in the peacebuilding process? What about local ownership? There is a broad consensus on the need to involve inside and outside actors in most peace settlements. Hampson assessed the impact of several factors based on the success or failure of peace settlement negotiations and concluded that third-party intervention contributed greatly to successful postsettlement peacebuilding. Caplan observes that a minimum of local ownership is needed in a transition regime.

Without local ownership, it is difficult to develop political responsibility; the wrong lessons would be remembered by the local population and the legitimacy of the transition process be called into question. This is illustrated by the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the High Representative could dismiss elected or appointed officials.

The HR could remove anyone from office who, in his view, was obstructing the implementation of the Dayton accord. This has been called despotic or transnational authoritarianism. Large believes that the unique resources brought by local actors to the process make it imperative that meaningful participation take place.

To get a better understanding of the degree of coherence achieved in peacebuilding operations, it would be useful to study the nature of coordination and coherence in the six components of peacebuilding architecture: 1 the end state or definition of peace and theoretical assumptions about the preconditions to achieve that peace, 2 the baseline or analysis of the conflict and the peacebuilding deficiency, 3 the analysis of the context, 4 the planning of the peacebuilding process, 5 the nature of coordination, and 6 the monitoring and evaluation of the impact of the peacebuilding efforts Reychler The degree of coordination : Jones and Cherif distinguish integrated, coordinated, parallel, and sequential peace operations.

In integrated operations the full scope of operations is managed within a single chain of command. De Coning uses a scale going from coherence, cooperation, and collaboration to coexistence. Coherence, the highest degree of coordination, refers to a coalition that acts upon a standard mandate, strategic vision, and objectives Friis and Jarmyr Jordan and Schout measure coordination on a nine-level Metcalfe scale: independent policy making, exchange of information, consultation, speaking with one voice, looking for consensus, conciliation, arbitration, setting margins, and working towards a specified objective.

Strategy formation : Choices also need to be made about the management of the peacebuilding process. Hart identifies five modes of strategy-formation processes.

This framework is built around who is involved in the strategy formulation and in what manner. In the command mode , a strong leader controls the process.

The strategy is a conscious, controlled process that is centralized at the top. The end state, the baseline, and alternatives are considered, and an appropriate course of action is decided upon and implemented. This strategy formation mode can vary from being directive to coercive using power to impose change Balogun and Hailey The symbolic mode involves the creation, by the actors who take the lead, of a clear and compelling vision and mission. The major task is to motivate and inspire and to provide the necessary focus to guide the creative actions of the actors involved.

Education and communication are core activities. This mode requires a great deal of participation and commitment.

The rational mode is a theory-driven strategy formation. Strategy is developed through formal analysis and information processing and strategic planning. The transactive mode is based on interaction and learning rather than on the execution of a predetermined plan. Strategy is crafted based upon an ongoing dialogue with the key stakeholders. Cross-sector and cross-level communication between the actors involved is very important in this mode.

It supports the civil and political rights of the Ukrainian citizens by reassembling the foundation of peace through activities undertaken from the far side of the conflict in which democratic nations play an important role. On the other side peacemaking is represented through activities such as mediation, conciliation, and judicial settlement. Sarigiannidis argued that this agenda has been misapplied and not used as an essential foundation of UN principles and practices.

There must be a shift towards local capacity building, away from patronage and towards partnership. So far, the US model has failed to address these issues and continues the business as usual - neglecting the postconflict realities by continuing to enforce institutionalisation and competitive elections. These are the main causes of continuing violence in post-conflict societies, which have a very fragile democracy built into their governance system.

Peacebuilding and democratisation must retain its original purpose by focusing in areas which consolidate peace in the short-term by managing the future through conflict prevention and reconciliation strategies rather than resorting to violence.

The next step is building local democratic capacities by using knowledge from appropriate segments of society to enhance the legitimacy of peacebuilding by adding post-conflict political reconstruction activities rather than institution building alone.

All multilateral or bilateral strategies for democratisation need reformulation and retooling. Let's talk about deductive versus inductive approaches to peacebuilding. The deductive approaches to peacebuilding are driven by donor tools and capacities which tend to favour institutions over processes and ultimately will result in failed or mixed outcomes. The inductive approach is focused on conflict parameters and strategies that are being employed.

Local capacity building means that local priorities are identified at all levels of society. It is centred on peacebuilding processes rather than building institutions. Inductive strategies include managing conflict without violence, local participation, and the use of appropriate forms of knowledge. We can note the latest developments in Ukraine, for example, to realize the need for conflict prevention and especially the need for inductive strategies of partnership with local agencies.

Peacebuilders must be facilitators rather than be perceived as dominant occupiers. It is imperative to end the culture of dependency which was created by some international organisations. Instead we must resolve conflicts by using grassroots solutions and integration of local groups and organisations. A creative and effective initiative is to foster a legitimate traditional and culturally specific model of inter-group decision-making employing norms of democracy.

Including local representatives at the highest level in planning and coordination of peacebuilding would increase the opportunities for participation in shaping the design of these missions and increase accountability. Any peacebuilding activity that does not involve local traditional values and culture will not last.

Any form of peace intervention, technical or financial aid and diplomatic work will fail if the local people are not consulted and involved in the process. Through recognition and shared authority given to the local organisations, their civil and political rights are enforced.

It will lessen the power gap between government and citizens. A balance of power is necessary to maintain peace while a new and effective structure of governance is built in post-conflict societies. Such reform should have the following objectives:. These represent executive decisions which must be considered as essential in enforcing peacebuilding and democratic change. These cases reflect the peace processes that are participatory and where the defeated join in the governance. They can compete for elected office and allow the opposition in power-sharing.

They are:. Peacemaking can take place only when there is a consent-based recognition of legitimacy between the parties involved.