When is foreign aid credible

More Less. Saved in:. Full text More access options. Check Google Scholar. In German libraries KVK. I need help. More details. Seminar Papers. Published in Journal of Development Economics, , pages The lack of a supranational legal authority that can enforce private contracts across borders makes debt repayment in an international setting contingent on borrowers' willingness to pay rather than … Expand. Mendoza … Expand. View 4 excerpts, cites background and results. Aid Effectiveness and Limited Enforceable Conditionality.

Foreign aid and rent-seeking. To address the relationship between concessional assistance, corruption, and other types of rent-seeking activities, the author provides a simple game-theoretic rent-seeking model. Insights with … Expand.

View 2 excerpts, cites results and background. Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid. Critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure.

In this paper I analyze the effectiveness of foreign aid programs to gain insights into political regimes in … Expand. Foreign Aid's Impact on Public Spending. Using a model of aid fungibility, the authors examine the relationship between foreign aid and public spending.

Based on a panel of cross-country and time-series data, their results show that roughly … Expand. Aid, Policies, and Growth. The authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid, economic policies, and growth of per capita GDP. In panel growth regressions for 56 … Expand.

Publisher Summary This chapter reviews the role of equity in the international distribution of developmental aid. Disbursements of foreign aid are guided in part by the needs of the poor. Anticipating this, recipients have little incentive to improve the welfare of the poor. The welfare of all parties might be improved by tied project aid and by delegating part of the aid budget to an international agency with less aversion to poverty.

Svensson studies foreign aid policy within a principal agent framework. He shows that one reason for foreign aid's poor overall record may be a moral hazard problem that shapes the aid recipient's incentive to undertake structural reform. He shows that one reason for foreign aid's poor overall record may be a moral hazard problem that shapes the aid recipient's incentive to undertake structural reform.

The model's basic prediction is a two-way relationship: Disbursements of foreign aid are guided in part by the needs of the poor.